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Transgender Marriage and the Legal Obligation to
Disclose Gender History
Alex Sharpe*
Section 12 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 as amended by the Gender Recognition Act 2004
requires transgender people to disclose their ‘gender history’ to the other party to a marriage prior
to the marriage ceremony.Failure to do so enables the other party to exit the relationship through
nullity proceedings.This article argues that this provision is discriminatory and encroaches on the
right to privacy, breaching Articles 14 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It
challenges the idea, implicit in the provision, that non-disclosure of gender history is unethical or
fraudulent. Crucially, the article considers and rejects the claim that discrimination against and
encroachments on the privacy of transgender people are justified because inadvertent sexual
congress with a transgender person is potentially harmful. Finally, if a consent-based right to know
exists, it argues that it ought to be trumped by considerations of justice, legal consistency and
public policy.
Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: Leave it to our
bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order.1
INTRODUCTION
This article aims to interrogate a specific legal obligation placed on transgender
people2 intending to marry or enter into a civil partnership in the UK. By virtue
of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (GRA) transgender persons who comply
with particular medico-legal conditions are entitled to have their‘acquired’gender
status legally recognised including for the purposes of marriage.3 However, and
while the legislation emphasises the comprehensiveness of legal recognition, it is
*Professor of Law at Keele University. I would like to thank Les Moran and Angus Dawson for reading
through drafts of this article, for their constructive comments and for their generosity. I would also like
to thank the two anonymous referees for the Modern Law Review whose careful readings of the article
and considered comments have been particularly helpful.
1 M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon Books, A. M. Sheridan Smith tr,
1972) 17.
2 For a discussion of trans terminology see L. Feinberg, Transgender Liberation:A MovementWhoseTime
has Come (NewYork:WorldView Forum, 1992); K. Bornstein, Gender Outlaw: On Men,Women, and
the Rest of Us (NewYork: Routledge, 1994); and R.A.Wilchins, Read My lips: Sexual Subversion and
the End of Gender (Ithaca, NewYork: Firebrand Books, 1997).
3 Full recognition under the GRA requires transgender applicants to be at least 18 years of age at the
time of applying for a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) (s 1);to have been diagnosed as‘having
or having had gender dysphoria’ (s 2(a)); to have lived in the ‘new’gender for a period of 2 years (the
so-called ‘Real LifeTest’) (s 2(b)); to sign an affidavit stating an intention to live permanently in the
‘new’gender‘until death’(s 2(c));and if previously married,to have divorced (s (3)).Recognition does
not require that an applicant has undergone any surgical procedures or taken hormones.
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clear that limits are set.This article is concerned with one particular limit and its
implications. Through an amendment to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
(MCA), legally recognised transgender people are, in order to avoid nullity
proceedings, required to disclose particular facts prior to any marriage or civil
partnership ceremony.4 The facts that are required to be disclosed pertain to a
transgender person’s gender history.What must be rendered is an autobiographical
account of a gendered life prior to legal recognition of ‘acquired’ gender status.
Failure to do so enables the other party to seek an annulment of the marriage or
civil partnership and therefore accelerated exit from the relationship.
The reader might wonder why an analysis of this specific legal obligation
placed on transgender people matters. Indeed, a provision enabling early exit
from a marriage, rather than leaving the parties to the law of divorce, might be
viewed as desirable. That is to say, once a marriage relationship has broken
down, good policy reasons for keeping the marriage alive legally might be
considered wanting. However, I am not concerned with this issue here. Rather,
this article will contend that the enactment of the gender history ground
matters because it impacts negatively on transgender people in a number of
ways. First, implicit in the creation of the gender history ground is the legal and
broader cultural assumption that non-disclosure of gender history to a prospec-
tive marriage partner constitutes some form of harm.This assumption will be
challenged. Second, the gender history ground singles out gender as the slice of
subjectivity in relation to which disclosure of historical ‘facts’ must be made. It
is not entirely clear why gender is singled out.There are no corresponding legal
obligations in the MCA pertaining to, for example, race, disability or sexuality.
Moreover, and significantly, the gender history ground does not apply to all
persons intending to marry. Rather, it is confined to transgender people as a
specific class. That is to say, it is only transgender people who are required to
disclose their gender history. In this respect, the gender history ground appears
to be discriminatory and therefore in conflict with Article 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
Third, the requirement to disclose gender history constitutes a significant and
illegitimate invasion of privacy and therefore of personal autonomy. In this
respect, it conflicts with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, which guarantees the right to respect for private and family life. Fourth,
it is necessary to challenge the idea that non-disclosure of gender history is in
some way unethical or fraudulent. In this respect, and in particular, the article will
4 GRA, s 11 gives effect to schedule 4 to the Act. Crucially, paragraph 5 of schedule 4 amends the
MCA, s 12 to add a new ground for rendering a marriage voidable, namely:
(h) That the respondent is a person whose gender at the time of the marriage had become the
acquired gender under the Gender Recognition Act 2004.
Paragraph 42 of the Explanatory Notes to the Act provides further detail as to how this section is
to operate.Thus where:
At the time of the marriage one party to the marriage did not know that the other was previously
of another gender, the former may seek to annul the marriage.
A provision pertaining to non-disclosure of gender history is also present in the Civil PartnershipAct
2004.Thus a civil partnership will be voidable where the respondent had obtained a GRC (s 50(e))
prior to the ceremony and the petitioner was unaware of this fact (s 51(6)).
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consider how law constructs ‘truth’ around the facts it demands be disclosed.5
While these types of detriment can have practical effects, my central concern
about the gender history provision operates at the discursive or symbolic level.
This is because the provision represents transgender people as sexually harmful,
gender ambiguous and deceptive. Sexually harmful: because inadvertent sexual
contact with a transgender person is scripted as harmful. Gender ambiguous:
because the gender history ground implies some ‘truth’ about (trans)gender that
is inconsistent both with the fact of legal recognition and the prior gender
experiences of many transgender people.Deceptive:because this is precisely what
non-disclosure is presumed to be.These claims need to be repudiated.
In taking up this challenge the article will consider and reject arguments that
can be offered in defence of the gender history provision.As we will see, the main
argument lies in the contention that gender history is a fundamental or material
fact that a non-transgender party to a marriage has a right to know.This supposed
informational right, which is implied by the existence of the gender history
provision, is based on the claim that in the absence of such information consent
fails. In dealing with these claims, the notion that gender history is a fundamental
or material fact that the other party to the marriage ought to know will be
contested.However, if gender history were to be considered a material fact it will
be argued that a consent based right to know ought to be trumped by consid-
erations of justice, legal consistency and public policy. Before detailing the ways
in which the gender history provision is discriminatory and an illegitimate
encroachment on privacy, and before advancing an argument that resists the
coupling of non-disclosure with unethical conduct, the article will first consider
the concept of harm.This is because it is precisely a legal assumption regarding
harm, whether rendered explicit or remaining implicit, that is used to justify the
provision. Moreover, it is precisely an assumption about harm that is likely to be
used to justify both discrimination and encroachments on privacy as well as the
characterisation of non-disclosure as unethical.
NON-DISCLOSURE OF GENDER HISTORY AND THE ASSUMPTION
OF HARM
The enactment of the gender history provision appears to be based on an
assumption that in the absence of disclosure some type of harm may arise.There
appear to be only two possible explanations for a conclusion of harm. First,
non-disclosure of gender history may have an impact on the procreative desires
of the other party to the marriage. Having children, and indeed one’s own
genetic children, is an important aspect of marriage for many people. However,
any attempt to justify the gender history ground through an appeal to consid-
erations of procreation is highly suspect. If this were a motivating concern law
might require disclosure not of gender history but of reproductive status. More-
over, there are many women and men who are infertile and failure to disclose this
5 While beyond the scope of this article, non-compliance with the gender history provision may also
lead to a finding of inequitable conduct barring ancillary relief under the MCA, s 25(2)(g).
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fact does not assume legal significance either in relation to the validity of a
marriage or its termination.
The other and more convincing explanation for the introduction of the
gender history ground lies in the legal view that the other party to the marriage
might not want to marry a person, and let us be honest about it, have sexual
intercourse with her, if made aware of her (trans)gender history. In other words,
and as Lowe and Douglas contend, the gender history provision apparently finds
its rationale and justification in the potential for ‘mistake’ over gender identity.6
The claim here is that a non-transgender person has a right to information that
is ‘material’ to making a decision regarding marriage and sexual congress.This
supposed right is based on the notion that in the absence of such information
consent fails.Therefore the justification of the gender history ground proves to be
based on two claims. First, gender history is a material fact that the other party to
a marriage ought to know if their consent is to be valid. Second, and implicitly,
there are no other considerations that serve to displace or override this right.
Both these claims are demonstrably false. Before considering each, the reader
should appreciate that this assertion of a right to know is based on an assumption
of harm. While the gender history provision is clearly framed in terms of
marriage, not sex, and while marriage is not reducible to sexual intercourse, it is,
primarily, concern over inadvertent sexual congress with transgender people that
animates the provision. It is this possibility that clearly concerned the parliament
and more generally the courts.7 It is this conception of harm that the article will
challenge.
The claim that gender history ought to be disclosed in the marriage context
because it is a fundamental or material fact that goes to the question of consent,
and therefore autonomy, is easily understood.Moreover, it almost certainly enjoys
considerable weight in normative terms. The argument is perhaps put most
forcefully by Herring, albeit with a different emphasis, and albeit in the context
of rape where the question of consent also looms.The issue of consent in sexual
contexts, is perhaps, especially relevant given that the gender history ground is
animated by legal anxiety over the possibility of sexual congress.While recogn-
ising that total transparency would place an undue burden on individuals,
Herring insists that, if consent is to be valid, facts must be disclosed where
considered ‘material’ by the other party.8 Thus, for Herring, whether a fact is
material or not depends, not on some general view, but on the subjective
viewpoint of the other party. Yet, in the transgender context, this distinction
between subjective and objective understandings of what constitutes a material
6 N. Lowe and G. Douglas,Bromley’s Family Law (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 10th ed, 2006) 90.
7 See notes 25–32 below. Moreover, it is precisely heterosexual intercourse and therefore the possi-
bility of procreation that explains why gender actually matters in the context of marriage.Of course,
it might be claimed that non-disclosure of gender history produces harm even where a marriage
relationship remains non-sexual.The characterisation of inadvertent sexual congress as harmful puts
the case for harm at its strongest through invoking the right to sexual integrity.Accordingly, it is this
claim of harm that the article will challenge. In any event, it is contended that, irrespective of sexual
congress, feelings of disgust and/or revulsion occasioned by knowledge of gender history fail to
meet a threshold of harm sufficient to justify state intervention against transgender people (J. S. Mill,
On Liberty (London: Longman, 1998).
8 J. Herring, ‘Mistaken Sex’ (2005) Crim LR 511–524, 523.
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fact unravels, at least to the extent that it has any impact on the question of
disclosure.Thus he asks: ‘would a trans-person be required to reveal their bodily
history to their partners in case they would not consent to sexual relations if they
knew. If so, would that be an improper invasion of the rights of privacy of a
trans-person?’9 His answer: privacy rights ‘must be subservient to the right to
sexual integrity of their partner.’10
The difficulty here is evident in the way Herring poses the question. In his
transgender scenario we do not know the viewpoint of the non-transgender
party. Moreover, this is, perhaps, likely to be typical. Disclosure must take place
precisely because of this uncertainty. Of course, Herring will say that a fact is not
material if this subsequently proves to be the viewpoint of the other party.
However, by then, disclosure may, and is expected to, have occurred. In other
words, the obligation to disclose arises because of the possibility, not the actuality,
of non-consent.This is clear from the gender history provision, and it is also clear
from Herring’s argument given his emphasis on the need to disclose ‘in case [the
other party] would not consent if they knew.’ It is precisely because of this danger
that Herring views privacy rights as being subservient to the right to sexual
integrity.The fact that gender history may subsequently prove to be non-material
to the other party does not serve to remove the obligation to disclose because in
normative terms gender history is always likely to be considered a material fact.
Moreover, if gender history were to be considered a material fact by the other
party, then on Herring’s view of consent, a sexual crime by ‘fraud’ would occur
in the absence of disclosure. Moreover, he is not alone in this view.11 It might be
objected that a transgender defendant would not be found guilty due to a lack of
mens rea even if Herring’s proposed definition of consent were to be legally
adopted. However, under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 the prosecution need
only show that the defendant lacked a ‘reasonable belief ’ in consent. Again, in
normative terms, it seems highly unlikely that a jury would consider a belief in
consent to be reasonable in circumstances of non-disclosure.
We need to unpack Herring’s claims further. It is, in the present context, far
from clear that a right to sexual integrity ought to take precedence over a right
to privacy. In the first place, the sexual integrity argument assumes an absence of
consent. In turn, consent is presumed to be absent where gender history is
considered to be a material fact by the party who lacks knowledge. Gender
history ought not to be considered a material fact in legal terms. When a
transgender woman stands before a man at a marriage ceremony the material fact
is that she is a woman. This claim is legally as well as psychologically and
anatomically, and probably biologically,12 accurate. Law ought not to go behind
9 ibid, 522–523 (emphasis added).
10 ibid, 523.
11 R.Williams,‘Deception, Mistake andVitiation of theVictim’s Consent’ (2008) 124 LQR 132–159,
149.The Law Commission have rejected such a conclusion and have noted its incompatibility with
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Law Commission, Consent in Sex
Offences:A Policy Paper:Appendix C of Setting the Boundaries (London:Home Office, 2000,para 5.31).
12 Contemporary scientific studies conducted post mortem on transgender women suggest that they
possess a female brain structure. Such studies support the hypothesis that gender identity develops
as a result of an interaction of the developing brain and sex hormones (L. J. G Gooren, J. N. Zhou,
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this central legal fact in search of other ‘facts.’The claim that a non-transgender
person’s right to sexual integrity should trump the privacy rights of transgender
people appears to be based on certain normative assumptions, namely, that many,
perhaps most, non-transgender people would choose not to have sexual inter-
course with a transgender person if informed in advance of gender history.While
these claims, which are implicit in the argument, appear to have no empirical
basis, they can be rejected even if true.This is because the key material fact ought
to be considered a transgender person’s legally recognised gender status,13 not
prejudice rooted in transphobia. If however, it were concluded that gender
history is a material fact and that non-disclosure operates to vitiate consent, it is
contended that a right to know based on a lack of consent ought to be trumped
in this context by other material considerations.
While Herring appears willing to sacrifice the privacy rights of transgender
people in favour of the right of others to sexual integrity, he fails to consider the
sexual or bodily integrity of transgender people. In the present context, infor-
mational privacy bears down directly on facts about the body, its history and
surgical alteration.This is something that Herring accords little, if any, weight.
However, more significantly, the weighing of interests requires consideration of
other factors. In particular, we might ask, should consent be viewed as vitiated
where its apparent absence is premised on racism? Herring would appear to think
so.14 Thus, according to the logic of Herring’s argument, where a woman is
anti-semitic and communicates her anti-semitism to her Jewish sexual partner,
rape occurs if he has intercourse with her without disclosing his Jewishness. In
other words, for Herring, Jewish status would be considered a material fact in
these circumstances. But why should this be the case? It appears counter-
intuitive.The difficulty here is that Herring appears willing to allow a very broad
definition of non-consent to trump a public policy concern over anti-semitism.
In other words, Herring appears to want to privilege consent even where its
apparent absence has its basis in racism. In short, if we are to take consent as
seriously as Herring suggests, it appears that we must take prejudice seriously in
equal measure. The consent argument here is a weak one and is not worthy
M. A. Hofman and D. F. Swaab, ‘A Sex Difference in the Human Brain and its Relation to
Transsexuality’ (1995) 378 Nature 68–70; F. P. M. Kruijver, J. N. Zhou, C.W. Pool, M.A. Hofman,
L. J. G. Gooren and D.F. Swaab,‘Male-To-Female Transsexuals have Female Neuron Numbers in a
Limbic Nucleus’ (2000) 85 J Clin Endocr Metab 2034–2041; see also M. M. McCarthy, J. M.
Schwarz, C. L. Wright and S. L. Dean, ‘Mechanisms Mediating Oestradiol Modulation of the
Developing Brain’ (2008) 20 J Neuroendocrinol 777–783; M. M. McCarthy, C. L. Wright and J. M.
Schwarz,‘OldTricks by an Old Dogma:Mechanisms of the Organizational/Activational Hypothesis
of Steroid-Mediated Sexual Differentiation of Brain and Behavior’ (2009) 55 Horm Behav 655–
665; E. Govier, M. Diamond, C. Slade and T. Wolowiec, ‘Dichotic Listening, Handedness, Brain
Organization and Transsexuality’ (2010) 12 Intl J Transgenderism 144–154).
13 Emphasis on legal recognition is not inconsistent with a view of transgender identity as stable and
long-standing. The legal stamping of gender as definitive does not ground ontological claims.
Rather, it provides them with the imprimatur of law and makes the right to marry possible.
Accordingly, once a GRC has been granted, which, of course, will always be the case in relation to
the marriage issue under consideration, there is no longer any discrepancy between gender identity
and legal gender status.
14 n 8 above, 523.
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of defending when measured against the public policy interest in countering
anti-semitism.
Interestingly, Williams distances herself from Herring regarding the Jewish
example.15 Her hesitancy, when contrasted with her attitude toward transgender
non-disclosure, is revealing. It is perhaps a distinction many people might make.
This however, does not point to its correctness. Rather, it serves to highlight
differential normative understandings brought to bear on questions of racism and
transphobia16 respectively.Concern over sexual integrity in the context of the law
of rape or marriage is as dubious in the transgender context as it is in the context
of anti-semitism. Indeed, it could be argued that concern over sexual integrity is
more dubious in the transgender context because the transgender person, unlike
the Jewish man in the example, does not conceal his/her identity. It might be
objected that equating transphobia with anti-semitism in this context only works
if minding about gender history is as transphobic as minding about race is racist.
This is precisely my argument.The fact that it provokes resistance reveals not the
falseness of the argument but society’s failure to take transphobia as seriously as
it does racism.Alternatively, the reader might concede that transphobia is no less
objectionable than racism but argue that, in the context of marriage, gender is
more important than race and therefore the right to know is stronger in relation
to gender. It is accepted that, in the context of marriage, gender is more
important than race.What is rejected is the claim that the right to know about
gender extends beyond the legal facts contained within a Gender Recognition
Certificate (GRC). To argue the contrary is to suggest that a GRC is an
unreliable indication of gender.17This runs contrary to the spirit of the GRA and
transgender law reform more generally. Moreover, this challenge to coherent
gender identity serves to bolster the problematic notion that there is something
of a yuk factor involved in sexual intercourse with transgender people.These are
not normative ideas that law should support. Indeed, the fact that transphobia
appears to be especially entrenched in our society,18 serves to strengthen a moral
15 n 11 above, 149.
16 ‘Transphobia is an emotional disgust toward individuals who do not conform to society’s gender
expectations . . .The “phobia” suffix is used to imply an irrational fear or hatred, one that is at least
partly perpetuated by cultural ideology’ (D. Hill and B. Willoughby, ‘The Development and
Validation of the Genderism and Transphobia Scale’ (2005) 53 Sex Roles 531–544, 91).
17 It might be suggested that the claim that a GRC is a reliable indication of gender does not sit well
with the possibility of a transgender man becoming pregnant subsequent to a marriage. Indeed, this
scenario has actually occurred in the USA http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/13/
gayrights-usa-thomas-beatie-pregnant (last visited 2 August 2011).A number of comments need to
be made here. First, the fact that a transgender man, Thomas Beatie, became pregnant does not
detract from his strongly felt sense of gender identity as a man. Given that his wife lacked
reproductive capacity he chose to delay a hormonal process that would have rendered him sterile in
order that the couple were able to become parents with at least some genetic link.This case might
be used to support the claim of a right to know. However, given the facts that this case is a rare
instance in another jurisdiction and that there is no evidence of any such occurrence in the UK, it
would seem disproportionate, on this basis alone, to single out transgender people for special legal
attention through the disclosure provision. Moreover, the decision to have a child in the Beatie case
was made jointly by both Thomas Beatie and his wife.There was no deception of any kind.
18 S. Whittle, L. Turner and M. Al-Alami, The Equalities Review: Engendered Penalties:Transgender and
Transsexual People’s Experiences of Inequality & Discrimination (London: Press for Change, 2007); J.
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obligation to communicate different and more appropriate norms. Further, if law
proves reluctant to conclude that consent is vitiated in the Jewish ‘rape by fraud’
example, then legal consistency ought to require the same conclusion in the
transgender context. If disclosure of gender history and disclosure of Jewish
identity are materially different, then the obligation to demonstrate this lies
with those who make this assertion. It has not been demonstrated and can only
be so by a self-defeating argument that relies on prejudice against transgender
people.
It is,of course,precisely this type of prejudice that explains the existence of the
gender history ground. Without such normative understandings the provision
would make no sense.The provision and arguments based on the right to know
imply that a transgender woman is not really a woman and/or that sexual
intercourse with her is not really heterosexual, or indeed lesbian in the context
of a civil partnership.These suggestions are both offensive and contrary to the
general tenor of the GRA. Thus the gender history ground for annulling a
marriage or civil partnership not only places a legal obligation on transgender
people to disclose facts that bear a highly personal and ontological character, it
also serves to detract from the recognition that the GRA ostensibly confers. In
other words, law’s assertion that a transgender woman is legally a woman is
undercut by the gesture law makes toward any party she might marry or with
whom she might enter into a civil partnership. It would seem that, within the
context of marriage, and through the gender history provision, the GRA con-
structs the ‘truth’ of sex as biological19 despite its apparent emphasis on a shift
from sex to gender.20 Transgender, it would seem, and despite the GRAs attempt
at normalisation, represents an excess, an unruly desire that threatens to prob-
lematise and engulf law’s binary understanding of bodies and their desires.The
assumption, implicit within the non-disclosure provision, that non-disclosure of
gender history represents a form of harm, appears to be an effect of law’s inability
to suspend its disbelief about bodies it has otherwise incorporated within the
social and legal order.This difficulty points to the transphobia and/or homopho-
bia of law. It would appear that law continues to see homosexual relations or at
least non-heterosexual relations even where they no longer exist according to its
own formal logic.This legal anxiety is given shape and colour by case law as well
as by the parliamentary debates surrounding the enactment of the GRA. Before
turning to consider these particular expressions of anxiety, it is however, first
necessary to deal with another potential objection that arises here.
Given the fact that there exists a degree of legal ambivalence concerning
transgender status, it might be argued, especially to the extent that legal recog-
nition is relied on to challenge the disclosure provision, that the GRA does not
effect a full transformation in gender status.This argument would serve to contest
the claim that present legal gender status is a reliable indication of gender.This,
Morton, Transgender Experiences in Scotland: Research Summary (Scottish Transgender Alliance: Edin-
burgh, 2008).
19 However, law’s construction of sex here fails to take into account the growing scientific evidence
pointing to a biological explanation for transgenderism (see n 12 above).
20 R. Sandland, ‘Feminism and the Gender Recognition Act 2004’ (2005) 13 Feminist Legal Studies
43–66.
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in turn, would support the claim of a right to know. There are however,
difficulties with such an argument. First, while the gender history provision does
reveal a degree of legal and political ambivalence concerning the gender status of
transgender people, section 9(1) of the GRA clearly states that a GRC constitutes
recognition for all legal purposes.To the extent that the gender history provision
detracts from the the broader aims of the GRA it invites criticism. Rather than
considering gender status to be incomplete, the better view is that legal condi-
tions are imposed on fully recognised transgender men and women which
encroach on their rights.The gender history provision does not challenge directly
‘acquired’ gender identity. Rather, it seeks to ensure that a prospective marriage
partner is informed that this legal status has not always been possessed.There is no
inconsistency here between legal gender status as stated in a GRC and the
long-standing sense of gender identity many transgender people experience.
Second, the view that law has not effected a full transformation in gender
status can be viewed as casting doubt on the authenticity of gender identity in the
case of transgender people. In particular, there is a danger of pathologisation.This
is especially so given that a diagnosis of gender dysphoria is the trigger for
everything that happens under the GRA. However, while gender identity dis-
order is technically a mental illness,21 it serves in practice to name a feeling of
incongruity between anatomy and gender identity thereby enabling medical
professionals to determine in individual cases suitability for surgery and hormone
administration.The mental illness model for comprehending transgender people
has become increasingly suspect and it is a source of considerable dissensus within
the World Professional Association of Transgender Health (WPATH).22 It seems
likely that in time gender identity disorder will be declassified as a mental illness
in much the same way that homosexuality was declassified as a mental illness by
the American Psychiatric Association in 197323 and by theWorld Health Organi-
sation in 1992.24
In pursuing the theme of legal anxiety over the possibility of inadvertent
sexual congress with transgender people, concern was expressed in the House of
Commons about a transgender woman who ‘had five lovers and did not tell any
of them that she used to be a man.’25 In relation to case law, in cases where
disclosure of gender history has occurred the courts have given particular empha-
sis to this fact and it has served both as a source of judicial relief and as a factor
21 DSM-IV-TR: Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Arlington,VA:American Psychiatric
Association Press, Inc, 4th revised ed, 1994) s 302.85. For a critique of the mental illness model in
relation to the GRA see S. Cowan,‘Gender is no Substitute for Sex:A Comparative Human Rights
Analysis of the Legal Regulation of Sexual Identity’ (2005) 13(1) Feminist Legal Studies 67–96.
22 http://www.wpath.org (last visited 4 August 2011). Indeed, the WPATH 2011 Bi-annual Sympo-
sium is entitled ‘Transgender Beyond Disorder: Identity, Community, and Health’ (Atlanta, Georgia
24–28 September 2011). See also W. Bockting, ‘Are Gender Identity Disorders Mental Disorders?
Recommendations for Revision of the World Professional Association for Transgender Health’s
Standards of Care’ (2009) 11(1) Intl J of Transgenderism 53–62.
23 R. Bayer, Homosexuality and American Psychiatry:The Politics of Diagnosis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1987.
24 The World Health Organisation removed homosexuality from its International Classification of
Diseases (ICD-10) in 1992.
25 The Hon Andrew Selous, HC Deb 2nd Reading col 166 11 March 2004.
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in moments of legal recognition.26 In cases where transgender individuals have
not disclosed their gender history prior to marriage legal anxiety has proved to
be especially evident. For example, in the NewYork contested marriage case of
Anonymous v Anonymous27 the court noted that on the night of his wedding, the
biologically male plaintiff soldier ‘awoke at 2 o’clock in the morning, reached for
the defendant [a pre-operative male to female transgender woman] and upon
touching the defendant, discovered that the defendant had male sexual organs’ at
the sight of which ‘[h]e immediately left the bed’ and ‘got drunk some more,’28
a scene vividly captured in Neil Jordan’s film the Crying Game.29
In the English context, this judicial concern is most dramatically illustrated in
the case of ST (formerly J) v J.30 In this non-disclosure of gender history marriage
case, the court noted that the effect of non-disclosure on a genetic wife, ST, who
had stated that she ‘was not into women,’31 had been ‘catastrophic and that she
[had] been traumatised by the experience.’32 We might wonder what precisely
constitutes harm here. In particular, is it ‘rooted in what the [complainant]
actually experienced, or does the social conception of the type of relations that
they experienced compel them to understand the experience as injury?’33 If the
latter, then law is revealed to be implicated in generating the very harm for which
it punishes transgender people.The horror that the perception of (trans)sexual
relations within marriage evokes is also apparent when contrasted with the
extensive list of ‘deceptions,’ including the potentially harmful non-disclosure of
HIV/AIDS, in relation to which Ward LJ expressed the view that, in contrast to
the case of J, he ‘would be very slow to allow an appeal to public policy striking
out a claim for ancillary relief.’34
This idea of transgender bodies, and particularly sexual congress with them, as
evoking legal horror is an important one in understanding the gender history
provision.The point becomes illuminated when we contrast law’s treatment of
transgender people with its treatment of intersex people. Intersex people are not
legally required to disclose information about their gender history because the
disclosure requirement only applies to those who marry by virtue of a GRC and
the GRA does not apply to intersex people. Different treatment might seem
strange given the existence of the provision and the concerns that animate it.
Moreover, it is perhaps not unreasonable to suggest that some people might like
to know that their intended marriage partner is intersex. It is contended that the
explanation for this differential treatment lies in the legal deployment of a
nature/artifice dyad.While both intersex and transgender people may undergo
26 See, for example, MT v JT 355 A 2d 204 (1976), 205; M v M [1991] NZFLR 337, 348; Re Kevin
and Jennifer v Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia [2001] FamCA 1074 at [39].
27 325 NYS 2d 499 (1971).
28 ibid, 499.
29 B. Morkham, ‘From Parody to Politics: Bodily Inscriptions and Performative Subversions in the
Crying Game’ (1995) 1 Critical inQueeries 47–68.
30 [1998] 1 All ER 431.
31 ibid, 439.
32 ibid, 456.
33 A. Gross,‘Gender Outlaws before the Law: the Courts of the Borderlands’ (2009) 32 Harv J L and
Gender 165–231, 199.
34 n 30 above, 466.
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genital surgeries, in the case of intersex people, surgery is understood as assisting
nature, whereas in the case of transgender people, surgery is understood as a
departure from it.35 It is precisely in this ‘unnatural’ space that law constructs
harm and an account of the ‘truth’ that challenges the authenticity of transgender
people.
The legal anxiety referred to in this section of the article reveals much about
legal and broader cultural understandings of transgender bodies, identities and
desires and their imagined relationship to harm. Ultimately, the gender history
provision, the normative understandings that underpin it and the forms of legal
reasoning adopted to defend it, all serve to perpetuate a view of transgender
people as a source of sexual danger, as ontologically unstable and as deceptive. In
thinking of the gender history provision in terms of harm, it becomes clear that
an emphasis on the right to know is not a step consistent with overall harm
reduction. Rather, the provision perpetuates transphobia. In the next section we
will see, that in addition to being harmful to transgender people, the provision is
also discriminatory.
THE GENDER HISTORY GROUND AS DISCRIMINATION
The legal requirement to disclose gender history can be viewed as discriminatory.
There are a number of reasons for this claim. First, the requirement to disclose
historical facts is limited to gender.There are other grounds within section 12 of
the MCA for annulling a marriage. However, only two pertain to non-disclosure
of information: having a venereal disease and being pregnant.36 Importantly, only
the gender history ground applies to a fixed identity group.37 Venereal disease
and pregnancy are more appropriately viewed in legal terms as states of affairs.
Further, it is only the gender history ground that relies for its operation on the
fact of non-disclosure. In relation to venereal disease and pregnancy nullity
proceedings can be initiated irrespective of knowledge, albeit that such proceed-
ings may fall foul of the equitable bar if the petitioner was aware of the relevant
facts.38 Accordingly, transgender people as a class, or at least those with a GRC
wishing to marry, are singled out and are alone required to disclose historical
‘facts.’ Thus it is historical facts about (trans)gender that law seeks to have revealed.
There is no such requirement in relation to, for example, race, physical
disability or sexuality.Thus a person is not, prior to marriage, required to disclose
the fact that s/he used to identify as lesbian, gay or bisexual and/or that s/he has
engaged in same gender sexual relations. Equally, in the context of a civil
partnership ceremony, a person is not required to disclose the fact that s/he used
to identify as heterosexual or bisexual or that s/he has engaged in opposite gender
35 A. Sharpe,‘EnglishTransgender Law Reform and the Spectre of Corbett’ (2002) 10(1) Feminist Legal
Studies 65–89.
36 MCA, s 12(e) and (f).
37 Conversely, anybody might become infected with venereal disease and any woman with reproduc-
tive capacity might become pregnant. In other words,MCA, s 12(e) and (f) are concerned with facts
the occurrence of which is contingent. There is nothing contingent about the fact of being
transgender.
38 MCA, s 13.
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sexual relations. In the context of disability, a person who either is or was legally
classified as disabled is not required to disclose this status prior to marriage. In a
similar vein, a person is not required to disclose their racial background.Thus a
person of mixed race might be presumed to be black or white. If the other party
to the marriage is labouring under some kind of misapprehension concerning
race or ethnicity, non-disclosure of racial or ethnic ‘facts’ produces no legal
consequences. It is not clear why gender history is singled out for special
treatment. Histories of, for example, race, sexuality and disability might be con-
sidered no less significant.They are histories that potential marriage partners may
wish to know. It would seem that in marriage law, historical ‘facts’ pertaining to
gender are considered more fundamental than other kinds of historical ‘facts.’
The reader might think that a legal emphasis on gender is simply an effect of
the gendered nature of the legal arrangements under consideration.That is to say,
marriage is open only to parties of the opposite gender and civil partnership only
to parties of the same gender. In contrast, facts about race, disability or sexuality
are legally irrelevant to the formation of a valid marriage contract. This is, of
course, legally correct, though it has not always been so in relation to race.39
However, it is important to remember that transgender persons who have been
issued with a GRC have received legal recognition of their ‘acquired’ gender and
are free to enter into the legal institutions of marriage or civil partnership.
Non-disclosure of gender history does not serve to challenge the rules governing
access to either form of spousal recognition. It does not render a marriage or civil
partnership invalid. Rather, it enables accelerated exit from a lawfully binding
agreement. Given these facts, it is less obvious why transgender people should be
singled out for special treatment with regard to the issue of disclosure. In other
words, while it is conceded that marriage is a gendered relationship, transgender
persons in possession of a GRC are appropriately gendered in legal terms.
It might, nevertheless, be contended that transgender is different in some
important way from race, sexuality and disability and that the difference justifies
discriminatory treatment. In particular, there appear to be two distinct, though
related, reasons for contending that transgender is materially different from race,
sexuality and disability.First, it might, in the present context,be claimed that there
has been a change of gender and that change is important to the question of
disclosure. Second, it might be claimed that transgender can be distinguished
from disability, race and sexuality on the basis of its greater invisibility.The first
claim is overstated.The GRA does effect change at the level of legal classification
of gender. However, in many, if not most, cases there is no change in terms of
gender identity. Rather, gender identity remains constant. In this sense, legal
recognition merely gives effect to what many transgender people have known
since childhood.
Further, an argument emphasising change as a distinguishing consideration
fails to recognise that race, sexuality and disability are not stable categories. All
39 Inter-racial marriage has been, and in some parts of the world continues to be, outlawed. In the US
context, such marriages remained unlawful in 17 states as recently as 1967 (Loving v Virginia 388 US
1 (1967)). See P. Pascoe, What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America
(NewYork: OUP, 2009).
Transgender Marriage
© 2012 The Author.The Modern Law Review © 2012 The Modern Law Review Limited.
44 (2012) 75(1) MLR 33–53
three categories can be viewed as socially constructed rather than referring to
definite or fixed groups of individuals living in the real world.These categories,
like gender, are best described as contingent. Thus, and by way of example,
disability is a legal category that can change either by way of expansion or
contraction over time depending on the drawing of legal boundaries. Accord-
ingly, it is possible for this status to be legally acquired or lost without any physical
change occurring. Moreover, legal definitions do not necessarily accord with
clinical or self-understandings of disability.40 In relation to race, the category has
no proper scientific basis. Rather, it is an idea that has its origins in a racist and
colonial past.41 As for sexuality, the categories of homosexuality and heterosexu-
ality are nineteenth century sexological constructs.42 Their relationship to the
sexual life-world can, as Queer theory contends, be viewed as reductive.43
Of course, race, sexuality and disability might be said to have relatively stable
normative meanings.The important point however, is that these meanings are no
more stable than those applicable to gender.The possibility of change exists across
all these categories. Indeed, gender is not perhaps the category where change is
most likely.The reader might object that, while gender change is no more likely
than change in other respects, reliance on gender stability is more significant to
a prosective marriage partner than the stability of race, sexuality or disability.This
may be so, though it needs to be emphasised in the transgender context that
instability should be understood in relation to legal, not ontological change.
Moreover, this might be viewed as strengthening the claim of a right to know in
the context of gender. However, and as already argued, the key material fact
ought to be considered current gender status which has been brought into
alignment with gender identity through the GRA. Knowledge of this fact ought
to exhaust a right to know. If this argument is rejected a right to know gender
history ought to be trumped by a public policy concern to limit transphobia.
The second claim, the claim of invisibility, assumes an ability and desire on the
part of transgender people to ‘pass’.44 While many transgender people lack the
ability to ‘pass’ successfully, it is evident that the non-disclosure provision aims
40 G. Albrecht and J. Levy, ‘Constructing Disabilities as Social Problems’ in G. Albrecht (ed), Cross
National Rehabilitation Policies:A Sociological Perspective (London: Sage, 1981) 14.
41 The ‘scientific’ study of race commenced in the mid-eighteenth century with Carl von Linneaus’
taxonomic study of human beings in Systema Naturae published in 1735 (see M. J. Anderson, Carl
Linnaeus: Father of Classification (United States: Enslow Publishers, 1997); W. Blunt, Linnaeus: the
Compleat Naturalist (London: Frances Lincoln, 2001); A. Polaszek, Systema Naturae 250 – The
Linnaean Ark (Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 2010). The view that racial categories are socially
constructed and lack a biological basis has been reinforced by the advent of DNA (J. Marks, Human
Biodiversity: Genes, Race, & History (NewYork:Aldine de Gruyter, 1995)).
42 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality:An Introduction (London: Penguin, R. Hurley trans, 1981); D.
F. Greenberg, The Construction of Modern Homosexuality (Chicago, Illinois: Chicago University Press,
1988); J.Weeks,Against Nature:Essays on History,Sexuality and Identity (London:Rivers Oram,1991).
43 J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990); E.
Sedgwick, The Epistemology of the Closet (NewYork: Penguin, 1990).
44 It should be recognised that ‘passing’ is controversial both as a practice and as an idea (see, for
example, S. Stone, ‘The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto’ in J. Epstein and K.
Straub (eds), Body Guards: The Cultural Politics of Gender Ambiguity (London: Routledge, 1991)
280–304; Bornstein n 2 above; L. Feinberg, Trans Liberation: Beyond Pink or Blue (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1998)).
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specifically to cover those who do. Indeed, it is the prospect of ‘passing’ that
confers meaning on the provision. In other words, but for the possibility of
‘passing’ that which law demands be disclosed would already be in the open.
Accordingly, it can be said that some transgender people and, more importantly,
those to whom the provision is directed implicitly, are invisible in social terms.
However, it is important here to be clear about what precisely it is that is invisible
about some transgender people.What is typically not invisible is present gender
role, gender identity and anatomical form all of which have received the impri-
matur of the law through a GRC. Rather, what is invisible is the fact that a
transgender person’s legal status has changed. Gender identity has not typically
changed. Rather, law has eventually recognised this fact and for all legal
purposes.45
In any event, it needs to be recognised that the other categories under
consideration,namely disability, race and sexuality,do not lend themselves to total
transparency.Thus many disabilities are not written on the surface of the body.
They are not therefore necessarily visible to potential marriage partners. In other
words, many disabled people ‘pass’ as able-bodied. In relation to the category of
race, persons of mixed race may, for example, appear to be black or white. By the
same token, many gay men ‘pass’ as straight in various social contexts. Homo-
sexuality is not typically written on the body.The important point to note here
is that ‘passing’ and therefore invisibility is not in any way unique to the lives of
transgender people.
However, the main legal difficulty here is not that gender, as distinct from
sexuality, race or disability, exhausts legal desire for historical knowledge. Rather,
it is the fact that while gender is singled out it is not gender at large with which
law is concerned. Rather, the legal obligation to disclose gender history applies
only to transgender persons legally capable of marrying or entering into a civil
partnership.That is to say, non-transgender women and men choosing to marry
are not generally required to disclose personal facts that relate to their gender
pasts.46 Thus, for example, non-transgender women and men are not required to
disclose the fact that in childhood they were considered tomboys or sissies and
perhaps enjoyed these gender roles.47 Rather, it is a particular kind of gender
experience with which law is concerned.
Therefore it would seem that the gender history ground for annulling a
marriage or civil partnership may contravene Article 14 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. Article 14 states that the enjoyment of rights and
freedoms set forth in the Convention ‘shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,political or other opinion,
45 GRA, s 9(1).
46 The reason for the caveat is that contraction of a sexually transmitted disease and pregnancy occur
within gender contexts.While these grounds for nullity (MCA, s 12(e) and (f)) do not depend on
non-disclosure, disclosure will make application of the equitable bar more likely (s 13). In this sense,
non-transgender people, and especially women, might be viewed as being incited by law to disclose
facts that pertain to gender.
47 M. Rottnek, Sissies and Tomboys: Gender Nonconformity and Homosexual Childhood (NewYork: New
York University Press, 1999); M. A. Abate, Tomboys: A Literary and Cultural History (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 2009).
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national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status.’While transgender is not specifically covered, the term ‘sex’ has been
interpreted by the European Court of Justice to include transgender persons
intending to undergo, undergoing or having undergone gender reassignment.48
Sex discrimination under Article 14 does not therefore cover transgender people
who do not intend or who are unable to undergo gender reassignment surgery.49
In recognising the possibility of a discrimination claim under Article 14 it should
be appreciated that Article 14 does not protect against discrimination at large.
Rather, it provides protection only where discrimination encroaches on a specific
right guaranteed under the Convention.The Convention rights undermined by
the gender history ground of the MCA are the right to marry, guaranteed by
Article 12, and the right to privacy, guaranteed by Article 8.While the gender
history ground does not preclude a lawful marriage from taking place, it consti-
tutes direct discrimination under Article 12 because it treats the status of that
marriage differently from other marriages in an unfavourable way on the ground
of sex. The following section will consider how the gender history ground
encroaches on the Convention right to privacy.
THE GENDER HISTORY GROUND AS AN ENCROACHMENT ON
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The legal requirement to disclose gender history requires the disclosure of highly
personal and private information.Accordingly, it might be viewed as constituting
a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.According
to Article 8 ‘everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.’The content of the phrase ‘private and family life’
has been interpreted widely.50 In R (Wood) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
Laws LJ suggested that the core value protected by the right is ‘the personal
autonomy of every individual.’51 The ‘physical and psychological integrity’52 and
the ‘physical and social identity’53 of individuals have also been noted to fall
squarely within the protection of the right. In particular, and for present purposes,
Laws LJ highlighted that an individual’s personal autonomy should make him
‘master of all those facts about his own identity.’54 In a similar vein, and in an
48 P v S and Cornwall County Council Case C-13/94 [1996] ECR 1–2143. This interpretation of the
law has been confirmed and extended in later case law of the European Court of Justice. See, for
example,Sarah Margaret Richards v Secretary of State forWork and Pensions Case C-423/04 [2006] ECR
1–3585.
49 It should be recognised that because legal recognition under the GRA does not depend on gender
reassignment surgery, some transgender people choosing to marry will not be able to rely on Article
14.Accordingly, discrimination claims based on the gender history provision are likely to be more
circumscribed than breach of privacy claims brought under Article 8.
50 See, for example, X andY v the Netherlands [1985] 8 EHRR 235 at [22]; Mikulic v Croatia [2002] 1
FCR 720 at [53]; Pretty v UK [2002] 35 EHRR 1 at [66]; R (Wood) v Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis [2009] EWCA Civ 414 (Wood).
51 Wood ibid at [20].
52 Pretty v UK n 50 above at [50] perVon Hannover J; at [66] per Marper J.
53 ibid at [66] per Marper J.
54 n 50 above at [21].
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earlier House of Lords decision, Lord Hoffmann noted that ‘the law now focuses
upon the protection of human autonomy and dignity’ and that this includes ‘the
right to control the dissemination of information about one’s private life.’55 It is
contended that historical facts concerning gender are deeply personal and private
for many transgender people. A legal requirement to disclose gender history
might therefore be viewed as contravening Article 8(1). Certainly, in the context
of non-disclosure of gender history prior to sexual intercourse, the Law Com-
mission have taken the view that to view this as rape by fraud would be
incompatible with the state’s Article 8 obligations.56
However, there are limits to the right to privacy. In Wood Laws LJ noted three
qualifications. First, if Article 8 is to be engaged, ‘the alleged threat or assault to
the individual’s personal autonomy must . . . attain “a certain level of serious-
ness.”’57 It can hardly be suggested that compulsory disclosure of highly personal
information pertaining to pre-transition gender history lacks seriousness.Second,
enjoyment of the Article 8 right assumes that on the facts the claimant has ‘a
reasonable expectation of privacy.’58 Again it seems clear that transgender people
have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their pre-transition legal
gender status. Indeed, the GRA emphasises this point through the creation of a
criminal offence in circumstances where persons acting in official capacities
disclose information concerning a person’s gender history.59 The issue that arises
here is whether the interest of the state and/or the other party to a marriage in
knowing historical ‘facts’ concerning gender outweighs a transgender person’s
right to privacy. It is precisely this concern to balance interests that Laws LJ posits
as his third qualification.60 Specifically,Article 8(2) provides states with an escape
clause if they can show that breach of the right of privacy is justified on the basis
of ‘national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’
If the state is to rely on Article 8(2) as justification for the nullification of a
marriage on the basis of non-disclosure of gender history, it is ‘the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others’ that would be the most appropriate part of
Article 8(2) to assert. In relation to the rights of others, the court in Goodwin v
UK made clear that a fair balance has ‘to be struck between the general interest
of the community and the interests of the individual.’61 It is contended that to
conclude that the interests of others, the community and/or the state outweigh
the interests of transgender people in this context would, in order to be con-
vincing, require a demonstration that non-disclosure of gender history constitutes
some form of harm. It is precisely the possibility of harm that would create the
right Article 8(2) is designed to protect. Moreover, without the possibility of
consequential harm it is difficult to see how a right to know the gender history
55 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at [51].
56 n 11 above.
57 n 50 above at [22].
58 ibid.
59 GRA, s 22.
60 n 50 above at [22].
61 (2002) 35 EHRR 18 at [72].
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of a marriage partner could arise or, at least, be legitimately defended.This claim
of harm is one already considered and rejected.
Moreover, in balancing the interests of transgender people against those of the
state it is important to recognise that the issue of non-disclosure of gender history
has not, so far as I am aware, actually led to nullity proceedings under section
12(h) of the MCA.Further, the incidence of such proceedings is likely to be very
low.This is because the number of transgender people with a GRC, and who are
therefore able to marry, is miniscule.62 Of that number only a proportion will
want to marry. Of that portion only a very small number ‘pass’ successfully
enough to make disclosure an issue in practical terms. Others will choose to
disclose to intimates.What we are left with is a tiny number of people who might
be in a position not to disclose and who choose not to do so. Even if non-
disclosure were to be viewed as harmful, the gender history provision appears in
these circumstances to be an overwhelmingly disproportionate response to per-
ceived harm.Accordingly, it is contended that the state cannot rely onArticle 8(2)
in order to justify its encroachment on the privacy rights of transgender people.
Any attempt to do so is unlikely to strike a chord with the European Court of
Human Rights if challenged. In the next section, the article will refute the idea
that there is something necessarily fraudulent or deceitful about non-disclosure of
gender history.This idea of fraud or deceit, which precedes the GRA63 as well
as being embedded within it through the introduction of the gender history
ground, is, as we will see, one which again points to a legal failure to incorporate
transgender people fully within the normative legal order.
THE ETHICS OF NON-DISCLOSURE OF GENDER HISTORY
In this section it will be argued that non-disclosure of gender history is not
unethical, or at least not necessarily so. However, before proceeding to develop
this argument it should be recognised that objection to the gender history
provision does not depend on the ethical status of non-disclosure. As we saw
earlier, the non-disclosure provision is both discriminatory and encroaches on the
right to privacy. Further, if the reader concludes that non-disclosure of gender
history is unethical it does not follow that such behaviour should be subjected to
legal regulation.There is no necessary connection between law and immorality.64
It certainly does not follow that transgender people should be singled out for
special legal attention. Further, the burden of establishing the claim that non-
disclosure is unethical rests squarely with the party who asserts it.This is, perhaps,
especially so given the individualistic focus of contemporary culture and law and
the lack of any credible evidence of sufficient harm arising from non-disclosure
to justify the provision. It is contended that distress, disgust and/or revulsion are
62 The most recent available figures published by the Gender Recognition Panel are for August 2010.
At this time 2,605 GRCs had been issued. For more information see the Gender Identity Research
and Education Society website at http://www.gires.org.uk/grp.php (last visited 17 July 2011).
63 n 26, 27 and 30 above.
64 H. L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).
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inadequate forms of harm to justify state intervention against a minority group.65
To warrant serious consideration harm would need to be more substantial. In
determining rules by which to live it is at least as important for an individual to
consider the psychological, emotional and ontological risks of disclosure, as it is
to consider distress rooted in transphobia.The fact that a high degree of openness
might be seen as ideal within marriage does not on its own serve to qualify this
point.
Turning to the ethical question, implicit in the creation of the gender history
ground is the view that non-disclosure of gender history is deceitful, that it
represents some type of interpersonal fraud.This claim is disingenuous in at least
two ways. First, it is important to recognise that there are different ways of not
telling the ‘truth.’ These differences, it is contended, bear on the question of
whether non-disclosure ought to be regarded as deceitful, and therefore on the
question of whether an obligation to disclose gender history ought to exist.
Second, the gender history ground assumes or suggests that the paramount truth
about gender status resides not in the present but in the past. In this sense, failure
to reveal the past is presented as inconsistent with the truth and therefore as
ethically suspect. In this regard, and as already noted, the gender history provision
proves inconsistent with the GRA as a whole as well as contrary to transgender
law reform generally given that reform has sought to incorporate transgender
people within the normative legal order. In this latter regard, the issue might be
viewed as being less about transgender deceit and more about the inauthenticity
of law given law’s inability to commit fully to its own claims. What must be
contested here is precisely the manner in which ‘truth’ is legally constituted.What
is at stake is the ontological significance for many transgender people of past
‘facts’ that law demands be recounted.
Let us turn to these two arguments and sets of concerns. First, there are at least
three ways of not telling the truth – deliberately lying, actively misleading and
misleadingly withholding information.66 It is contended that deliberately lying
and actively misleading another are more morally problematic than merely
withholding information.Some scholars have argued that mere non-disclosure of
self to others is tantamount to fraud or deceit.67 However, as Schoeman observes,
provided that ‘a person does not misrepresent himself to those who, within the
relevant domain, reasonably rely on his projected image, that person is not acting
deceptively.’68 I hesitate to describe the withholding of information here as
‘misleading’ in anticipation of the second argument that will contest the notion
that particular constructions of fact, in relation to which misleading might be said
to occur, are accurate.
Withholding information is to restrict its flow. It is to keep things secret.Yet
secrecy is not the same thing as deception.As Bok notes:‘[t]o confuse secrecy and
65 Mill, n 7 above.
66 S. Wilkinson, ‘Why Lying is Worse than Merely Misleading’ (2000) 13 Philos Today 6–7.
67 R.Wasserstrom,‘Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions’ in R. Bronaugh (ed),Philosophical Law
(Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1978); R. Posner,‘The Right to Privacy’ (1978) 12 Georgia L
Rev 393–422.
68 F. D. Schoeman,‘Privacy and Intimate Information’ in F. D. Schoeman (ed), Philosophical Dimensions
of Privacy:An Anthology (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 403, 409.
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deception is easy, since all deception does involve keeping something secret . . .
But while all deception requires secrecy, all secrecy is not meant to deceive.’69
More significantly perhaps, is the fact that secrecy is central, indeed indispensable,
to human well-being.We must consider ‘the drawbacks of too much information
as well as those of being kept in the dark.’70 Indeed, others have argued that
privacy is essential to the formation of relationships, including those of love and
friendship. For relationships between self and others are based on an individual’s
ability to share and control personal information.71 In defence of some control
over secrecy and openness, Bok notes four different elements of human
autonomy: identity, plans, action and property.72 In relation to personal identity,
she contends, secrecy guards its central aspects.73 Indeed, for Bok, ‘without
perceiving some sacredness in human identity, individuals are out of touch with
the depth they might feel in themselves and respond to in others.’74 She argues
for ‘partial individual control over the degree of secrecy or openness about
personal matters – those most indisputably in the private realm.’75
It would be extremely difficult to argue that gender history does not fall
within this ambit of autonomy. It is perhaps difficult to specify the most appro-
priate analogy here.Secrecy,or perhaps we should say the maintenance of privacy,
in relation to gender history might be compared to the control of information
exhibited by some victims of child abuse.Yet,we would not demand that a victim
of child abuse disclose details of the abuse or even the fact of abuse within the
context of an intimate, including a marriage, relationship. The reader might
respond that this is because (a) an intimate partner would remain unaffected by
this piece of personal information and (b) it would be intolerable to demand
disclosure in these circumstances. In relation to (b) the point is sound. In relation
to (a) however, it is far from clear that an intimate partner would remain
unaffected over the course of a relationship.A history of child abuse might make
its presence felt in numerous ways.76 In pursuing this analogy it might be viewed
as equally intolerable that transgender people should be required to disclose
deeply personal information about their pasts. Like some victims of child abuse,
some transgender people choose and feel able to disclose information about their
pasts within intimate settings.However, for others, their chromosomal status, their
earlier gonadal and/or genital condition, as well as the gendered pattern of
socialisation to which they were subjected as children and young persons is a
source of pain and trauma.
Turning to the second argument it is important to recognise, despite the
foregoing discussion concerning the withholding of information and its moral
69 S. Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (Vintage Books: London, 1998) 7.
70 ibid 18.
71 C. Fried,‘Privacy:A Moral Analysis’ in Schoeman (ed), n 68 above 203; J. Rachels,‘Why Privacy is
Important’ in Schoeman (ed), ibid 290.
72 n 69 above 20.
73 ibid 13.
74 ibid 21.
75 ibid 27.
76 K. R. Berenson and S. M. Andersen, ‘Childhood Physical and Emotional Abuse by a Parent:
Transference Effects in Adult Interpersonal Relationships’ (2006) 33 Pers Soc Psychol B 1509.
Alex Sharpe
© 2012 The Author.The Modern Law Review © 2012 The Modern Law Review Limited.
51(2012) 75(1) MLR 33–53
implications, that the ‘facts’ which ought to be disclosed, or which might legiti-
mately be kept secret, are not agreed. To be more precise, contestation exists
around whether the ‘facts’ law demands be recounted are factually true.Thus the
gender history provision appears to require that a transgender woman, for
example, disclose the ‘fact’ that she has not always been a woman. But what does
this mean? Obviously, she has not always enjoyed this legal status. However, she
may have always had a clear sense of female gender identity, seeing herself first as
a girl and later a woman. Moreover, the notion that transgender is reducible to
psychological factors that can be readily trumped by biological ‘facts’ that reside
in the past, a notion implicit in the creation of the gender history ground, is
becoming increasingly suspect in scientific terms. There is growing scientific
evidence pointing to a biological account for transgenderism.77 Accordingly, the
disclosure requirement, at least in some cases, may be viewed as amounting to no
more than a requirement to disclose information about an initial, and incorrect,
legal classification as well as a history of coerced gender performance. It is hard
to conclude in these circumstances that a decision to control personal informa-
tion, and in the process retain some sense of personal autonomy, is in any
significant sense unethical.
CONCLUSION
This article has considered a specific legal obligation imposed on transgender
people who intend to marry or enter into a civil partnership. By virtue of the
MCA, as amended by the GRA, transgender people living in the UK are, prior
to going through a marriage ceremony, expected to disclose information about
their gender pasts. Failure to do so enables the other party to exit the marriage
in an accelerated fashion.This legislative provision is objectionable in a number
of respects. First, it is discriminatory, and therefore contrary to Article 14 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, in that it targets transgender people as
a class in a way that encroaches upon their Article 8 and 12 rights.There is no
corresponding legal obligation placed on non-transgender people to disclose
information about gender history. Second, it represents an encroachment upon
the right to privacy guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, one that is not
easily justified within the ambit of Article 8(2). Third, the logic of a contrary
finding would involve a conclusion that sexual contact with transgender people
is potentially harmful.This is a view that should not be given any legal oxygen
in normative terms. It is a view that runs contrary to the spirit of transgender law
reform and indeed the GRA itself. Further, the assumption of harm is premised
on the claim that gender history is a material fact.This claim has been rejected.
However, if gender history were to be considered a material fact, either in some
general normative sense or from the perspective of the other marriage party, this
should not serve to vitiate consent because a right to know in these circumstances
ought to be trumped by considerations of justice, legal consistency and a public
policy concern to limit transphobia.
77 Gooren et al, n 12 above; Kruijver et al, n 12 above; McCarthy et al, 2008 and 2009, n 12 above;
Govier et al, n 12 above.
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Finally, the article has sought to resist the legal and wider cultural tendency to
view non-disclosure of gender history as an unethical omission. In opposition to
this view, it was emphasised that secrecy does not equate with deception. On the
contrary, secrecy is an essential adjunct to the private life. Moreover, the exercise
of secrecy in relation to facts that bear a highly personal character is the very
essence of personal autonomy and therefore the very essence of the set of rights
protected by Article 8. In addition to this objection to the characterisation of
transgender secrecy as deception, there is the further concern that this type of
analysis concedes too much.That is to say, it is not simply a case of past ‘facts’ that
ought to be disclosed, or over which privacy might be legitimately exercised.
Rather, given the nature of transgenderism, the past ‘facts’ in question are not
necessarily agreed, or indeed experienced.
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